When Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel announced the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) in 2017, they envisioned a European flagship project: a joint sixth-generation air combat system, supported by Germany, France, and later Spain. FCAS was intended not only to set technological standards but also to underscore Europe’s ability to act in defense policy matters. Eight years later, however, it is clear that old lines of conflict, national value creation, disputes over leadership roles, and issues of technology transfer are increasingly putting a strain on the project. Against this backdrop, the question arises: Quo vadis, FCAS?
Project structure
Following its announcement in 2017, the FCAS took concrete shape with initial definition work by the German Federal Ministry of Defense and the French Ministry of Defense. A major European project spanning approximately twenty years, it is being led by Germany, France, and Spain. The goal is a comprehensive system comprising Next Generation Fighters (NGFs), unmanned companion components (Remote Carriers, RCs), and a networked Combat Cloud, which is to be tested in flight-capable demonstrators by 2029.
The program is organizationally structured into seven so-called pillars. In addition, Item 0 is responsible for harmonizing the individual areas and coordinating joint working practices. Each partner nation has a national industry coordinator: Airbus Defence & Space for Germany, Dassault Aviation for France, and Indra Sistemas for Spain.
The seven pillars are distributed as follows:
- Pillar 1 fighter aircraft (NGF): Prime Dassault Aviation, Main Partner Airbus Deutschland
- Pillar 2 engine: EUMET joint venture, supported by Safran (France) and MTU (Germany), with participation of ITP Aero (Spain)
- Pillar 3 Remote Carrier: Prime Airbus Deutschland, Main Partner MBDA (Germany, France, Spain) and SATNUS (Spanish consortium)
- Pillar 4 Air Combat Cloud: Prime Airbus Germany, Main Partner Thales (France) and Indra (Spain)
- Pillar 5 simulation environment: joint management (co-contracting) by Airbus, Dassault and Indra
- Pillar 6 sensors: Prime Indra (Spain), Main Partner FCMS consortium (Hensoldt, Diehl, Rohde & Schwarz – Germany) and Thales (France)
- Pillar 7 stealth capability: Prime Airbus Spain, Main Partner Dassault Aviation and Airbus Germany
Phase 1A began in 2019, the concept study defining the basic architecture and cooperation structures. Phase 1B followed in 2021, marking the start of concrete technology development. Technology demonstrators have already been developed in several areas, although the first flight-ready demonstrators are still pending. Nevertheless, important milestones have been achieved: a downselection of the NGWS architecture, a compromise on the maximum takeoff weight of the NGF, the establishment of an engine joint venture with a clearly negotiated workshare structure, and successful demonstrators in the areas of remote carriers, sensor technology, and the combat cloud. The collaboration has been assessed as constructive, particularly in the area of sensor technology.
The transition to Phase 2, the actual development and demonstration phase, is now imminent. The first flight-ready NGF demonstrators are scheduled to take flight starting in 2028/29. However, the previous schedule has fallen significantly behind schedule due to disputes over leadership claims and work shares. A solution to the outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Dassault’s industrial leadership role, was originally scheduled to be found in October. However, due to the renewed dissolution of the French cabinet and the associated reorganization of the French government, the negotiations were postponed. If no agreement is reached by the end of the year, it is likely that President Macron and Chancellor Merz will discontinue the project by mutual agreement.
Status quo
Since summer 2025, there have been renewed delays in the project, which have already postponed the start of Phase 2 by several months. For example, the French aircraft manufacturer Dassault has been calling for a redistribution of the FCAS work shares for some time, a move apparently supported by the French government. For example, French industry is demanding:
- at least two-thirds of the work share in the development and production of the NGF (Next Generation Fighter)
- Rejection of a Joint Design Office and sole decision-making authority in the design of the NGF, including selection decisions for subsystems
- No know-how transfer in the development of the demonstrator including black boxes for the German and Spanish partners
- Implementation by a joint venture based in France with Dassault holding the CEO position throughout
- a reduction of the Spanish work share on the NGF engine
Furthermore, the limitations of the NGF with regard to its orientation as a carrier-based aircraft and the deployment of nuclear-armed ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) such as the ASMP-A or the ASN4G result in a capability profile that does not fully meet the German Air Force’s requirements. Furthermore, the development of the French UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicle) within the framework of the Rafale F5 standard and the design of the PANG, the next-generation aircraft carrier, for NGF operations without a Large Remote Carrier (LRC) have led to some uncertainty regarding the export prospects of German LRCs to France.
Why is this not an option for Germany?
If the German government were to agree to Dassault’s demands and the FCAS program were to continue, Germany would have to accept that it would have no control over the project’s progress or the final product, despite significant financial contributions of over €10 billion and firm purchase guarantees. As with the F-35, Germany would be confronted with the manufacturer’s black boxes. Furthermore, the German aerospace industry would lose knowledge in the field of combat aircraft construction rather than gain it. Last but not least, Germany would potentially be relegated to the role of a supplier and, despite a significant order volume, would not receive its own NGF demonstrator based on the Eurofighter. Therefore, from an industrial policy perspective, these demands cannot be accommodated.
If the German workshare in the NGF were to be downgraded to the role of a supplier, the question also arises as to what advantage the NGF offers Germany. For example, entering the GCAP (Global Combat Air Program) or F-47 program, combined with a local production line and potential modification through the integration of German systems, could potentially achieve a comparable work share. This raises the legitimate question of why Germany should stick with FCAS and provide the necessary funding for the development of an aircraft that may not best meet the Air Force’s requirements.
With France also working on the development and procurement of its own Loyal Wingman, it seems increasingly likely that French procurement of systems developed under German or Spanish leadership would be virtually non-existent. In this case, FCAS would primarily represent a significant shift of financial volumes from Germany to France, for which there is no adequate compensation.
Last but not least, the current dispute between the project parties demonstrates that Dassault, and thus possibly also the French government, is unwilling to adhere to the original and contractually agreed terms, even though these already represent a major concession to the French aerospace industry. If Germany were to give in here, further unilateral contract terminations would have to be expected in the future, which would further undermine the German position. Therefore, a precedent should not be set here that would further complicate international cooperation in the future.
Possible solutions
In principle, the Federal Government now has three options for proceeding:
- The continuation of FCAS in different constellations
- Joining another program in different constellations
- A separate program in different constellations
Continuation of FCAS
If the German government wishes to maintain FCAS, this can be achieved in three ways. First, the NGF could be separated from FCAS and only a joint Large Remote Carrier and a joint Combat Cloud could be pursued. However, since Dassault is already working on a UCAV and a purely French NGF would already represent an extreme burden on the French national budget, a joint Wingman remains unlikely. While cooperation within the framework of the Combat Cloud would in principle be possible and welcome, this component of FCAS should not necessarily be limited to FCAS. A pan-European solution is needed to consolidate relevant data and ensure interoperability. Therefore, this pillar is only indirectly related to the joint development of aircraft.
Furthermore, France could take on a larger share of FCAS and, accordingly, provide the majority of the required budget. However, given French finances and German industrial policy interests, it is unlikely that Dassault’s plans will be followed.
Last but not least, the original agreements could be upheld, and Phase 2 of the program could be initiated accordingly. However, it is highly unlikely that Dassault will completely withdraw its demands, or that the French government will put Dassault in its place. Apart from that, it remains questionable whether FCAS can still be brought to fruition, given the clearly strained partnership between Airbus and Dassault.
Joining another program
In addition to the FCAS, two other sixth-generation fighter aircraft are being developed: the GCAP and the F-47, whose procurement by Germany would be a logical step in principle. The German government could still consider a delayed entry and negotiate which work shares could still be assumed by German industry. However, since the work shares for GCAP have been allocated and the F-47, as a US program, is open only to junior partners, Germany would not be involved as an equal partner here either. Therefore, it should be examined whether Germany could gain significant advantages by deciding on a program early.
Otherwise, Germany could put out a tender for the Eurofighter successor in the 2030s and search for potential suppliers without preconceived notions. Since Germany would likely be the most affluent country on the planet without its own development program in this scenario, it stands to reason that Germany is a highly attractive customer for all potential manufacturers. Accordingly, the German government could potentially negotiate a corresponding localization within the framework of a tender, while simultaneously determining which program best meets German needs.
Own program
Now that defense spending has been exempted from the debt brake and the German government has committed to NATO’s 5% target, the financial resources would be available to implement a German program of its own.
However, this would pose major challenges for Germany. Germany does not currently possess the complete know-how to independently develop a next-generation engine. While the two major German engine manufacturers, MTU Aero Engines and Rolls-Royce Deutschland, possess extensive experience in both the civil and military sectors, a consolidated national structure is lacking. MTU possesses strong expertise in areas such as low-pressure and high-pressure compressors, engine control, blisk production, variable cycles, and thrust vectoring. Nevertheless, no fully integrated combat engine has been developed in Germany since World War II, which is why deficits in systems integration exist. Closing these gaps would require significant financial and technological investments in MTU. In addition, cooperation agreements between MTU and Rolls-Royce Deutschland, promoted by the German government, could create additional development capacity.
Similar limitations apply to the systems integration of a complete combat aircraft. While Airbus has made key contributions to international projects such as the Tornado and the Eurofighter, responsibility and workloads have always been distributed among multiple partners. Nevertheless, German companies such as Airbus, Diehl, and Hensoldt possess a broad portfolio of market-ready systems that could be integrated into a new air combat system using an iterative approach. With the Air Force’s National Test and Development Center, new infrastructure, and platforms such as the Eurofighter STAR and the A320 ATRA, Germany will have the necessary resources to test and mature new technologies in the future. Germany is particularly well positioned in the areas of avionics, radar development, and crewed-uncrewed teaming (CUC-T), which represents a key technology for the rapid introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in conjunction with manned jets.
Despite these strengths, a purely national program would hardly be sustainable in the long term. The Air Force’s needs alone are insufficient to ensure the necessary production volume and thus economic sustainability. Furthermore, Germany would have to fundamentally rethink its previously restrictive stance on arms exports to create a competitive industrial base.
Against this backdrop, a multinational program appears to be a more strategically sensible option. Sweden, with its defense company Saab, and Spain are considered potential partners. Saab has strong expertise in electronic warfare and systems integration, which would naturally complement German capabilities. Furthermore, Saab has long-standing cooperation structures with German companies such as Airbus and Helsing. In the case of Spain, Indra and its German industrial partner Hensoldt are already jointly developing an almost entirely new radar system for the Eurofighter. Furthermore, Rolls-Royce Germany is already working with the Spanish manufacturer ITP on the development of an engine for UCAVs. This existing cooperation provides a technological basis for a joint European engine program and demonstrates the benefits of integrating Rolls-Royce Germany into a larger multinational project. A joint project between Germany, Sweden, and Spain could thus pool the financial, technological, and industrial foundations to jointly develop a sixth-generation air combat system.
While developing a new engine would remain a technical challenge even in this configuration, pooling resources and expertise would significantly increase the chances of success. The existing ownership structures and strong industrial collaborations between MTU, ITP, and Rolls-Royce would also potentially facilitate a meaningful technology transfer in the engine sector. Furthermore, the Eurofighter’s EJ200 engine could initially be used for a demonstrator, which could also be modified.
Conclusion
The FCAS can continue to be a strategically viable project for Germany and Europe if the partners adhere to the existing contractual arrangements and the agreed workshare structure. This is the only way to ensure that all parties benefit equally from FCAS militarily, technologically, and industrially. However, if France insists on a significantly greater leadership role and a disproportionate work share, this must necessarily be accompanied by a higher financial contribution. An imbalance between responsibility, technological access, and cost share would be politically and economically unacceptable.
Furthermore, if the military requirements of the French armed forces, particularly with regard to carrier capability, are incompatible with the operational requirements of the German Air Force, an alternative program between Germany, Sweden, and Spain might be a better option. The requirements profiles of these three nations are likely to be more compatible, which, along with the previously successful technical and economic cooperation between the respective industrial companies, is a key factor. This constellation enables a balanced distribution of labor and increases the chances of establishing an economically viable program with a clear industrial and political perspective.
Should France pursue its own path, a smaller, nationally controlled program with significantly reduced financial resources and the partial abandonment of certain technological potential for the Armée de l’Air would be conceivable. Such an approach could follow the export model of the Mirage and Rafale, but would simultaneously limit the possibilities for European cooperation.
If the project partners wish to continue FCAS successfully, this can only be achieved through equal treatment. If France is unwilling to do this, or if their objectives diverge too far, Germany must find the courage to resolutely seek an alternative that better meets the operational requirements of the Air Force and German industrial policy goals. Regardless of the foreseeable decision regarding FCAS, it is essential that the further development of the Eurofighter and the expansion of key German technology in the field of military aerospace be actively pursued by the German Federal Government and the Bundeswehr.
The current disputes and the resulting uncertainty once again underscore the need for a sovereign industrial base to safeguard Germany’s security and alliance capabilities. Given various negative examples in the area of international armaments projects and procurement, it is important to prioritize military and industrial capabilities over European cooperation in the future.
This article was created in collaboration with AG. A German version is available on suv.report.