Lead up to the confrontation
On June 6, Wagner officially claimed their mission in Mali was over, a mission of which the Malian government denies the existence to this day.
This withdrawal was long announced: a few weeks after Prighozin’s march on Moscow in June 2023, it was decided that all missions currently carried by the Wagner Group would be transferred to groups under firmer Ministry of Defense (MoD) control, namely the newly created Afrika Korps*. On the ground, the most noticeable effect this transition will have is that Russian soldiers will benefit from more direct and total support by their MoD, as much as they see fit to allocate resources to this theater.
North East Mali is the most contested area of the country. It is arid, sparsely populated, and poorly equipped: the Malian Government has no control over the region outside of its bases. The most active groups in the area are the FLA, Azawad independance movement, mainly along the Algerian border, and the jihadist group JNIM, the local branch of Al Qaeda listed as a terrorist organization internationally by numerous countries, mostly present in the area bordering Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. In July 2024, the FLA inflicted a serious defeat on Wagner and Mali, killing several prominent members of the PMC, capturing others, and fully stopping an armed convoy in Tinzawaten, a city sitting on the border between Algeria and Mali. This convoy was part of a push, in an effort by Mali to regain control of the north of the country from the FLA.
In June 2025, another convoy departed from Kidal to reach Aguelhok and reinforce the existing military facilities there. This convoy again encountered FLA elements in a series of engagements that will be described here.
Timeline
On 03/06, a convoy leaves Kidal, heading southwest toward Anefis. It is comprised of about 40 vehicles, mainly military, with a few support trucks. Initially, the objective is unclear, and some separatists speculate that part of AK is falling back toward the capital, to provide additional security in the southwest, where JNIM intensified its activity recently.
On 04/06, somewhere between Kidal and Anefis, the convoy triggered an IED, with FLA units observing the results without engaging. They claimed the explosion destroyed 1 military vehicle, killing its occupants. The convoy then reached Anefis in the evening or the next day.
In Anefis, this convoy joins another 30 vehicles that had been stationed there for at least 2 months, as shown on satellite imagery. Those vehicles include heavy-duty trailer trucks carrying excavation equipment.
Low-resolution Sentinel-2 captures on the 09/06/2025 (left) and on the 19/06/2025 (right) show the removal of the vehicles south of the base.
On 11/06, the convoy is spotted leaving Anefis and heading north, toward Aguelhok. Now strong of roughly 70 vehicles, including armored ones, and a large russian presence, imply this is not just a resupply/rotation of the forces in Aguelhok: firstly, no FAMa convoy or patrol reached Aguelhok without fights for years. Secondly, the quantity of construction equipment carried is not necessary to just clear the road of IEDs and patch up the road: It is speculated that the goal is to create an airfield near Aguelhok. Such a move would allow FAMa/AK to deploy drones and helicopters more easily to the north eastern part Mali, providing desperately needed air support to their forces in the region on a shorter notice, and drastically increase loitering time for the strike drones that patrol the area in search of targets.
An IED on 12/06 disables a truck and trailer near Tachdait. The FLA then engages the column in a brief skirmish, retreating once the benefit of surprise settles. FLA claims it killed 4, including Afrika Korps soldiers, and produces a picture of patches as proof. At least one heavy-duty trailer is left behind, as the convoy pushes on.
Main attack near Anomalen
On the 13/06, the convoy is about 50km southwest of Aguelhok when another attack starts. According to video estimations, about 100 FLA fighters, using truck-mounted heavy machine guns, FPV and surveillance drones, pickups and bikes strike the convoy. During the initial clashes, part of the convoy security flees the scene, and FLA fighters are seen in the convoy, setting left behind equipment on fire, including:
- 1 StrongBull PY180 Road Grader, destroyed
- 1 Norinco VP11 MRAP, destroyed
- 1 Toyota Hilux with mounted HMG, destroyed after the HMG was removed
- 2 Toyota Hilux, captured (according to the independentists; it is virtually impossible to distinguish newly captured from previously acquired ones)
- 1 Cargo truck, destroyed
- 1 Cargo truck, emptied
- 1 Water cistern truck, struck by FPV drone
- 1 Excavator loaded on a truck and trailer, both destroyed. The excavator was also struck with an FPV drone
- 1 Bulldozer loaded on a truck and trailer, both destroyed
- 1 Dump truck, damaged
All of the vehicles listed as destroyed are seen in footage burning beyond saving, most of the time set on fire using jerrycans. This list is only based on footage and aims to prevent any kind of duplicate. This means there are likely more Toyota Hilux damaged or destroyed, as well as potentially another VP11, but the author could not confidently affirm it.
Afrika Korps claimed that the attack targeted a part of the convoy that was “mostly” manned by FAMa fighters. A Mi-24 is seen early in the attack, filmed from the FLA side and drawing heavy ground fire. The separatists claim it was hit and had to withdraw. AK posted a video claiming to show the helicopter striking pickup trucks, blurring the moment of impact.
Regardless of its actual damage status, the Mi-24 did not prove to be a significant threat in this engagement as it continued long after it was deployed, and it did not appear to remain in the area of operations for long.
At some point after this initial clash, a BTR guided by a drone engaged FLA fighters, successfully destroying 2 pickups and pushing the separatists into a retreat. AK published the footage filmed by the drone.
About 2 hours after the beginning of the engagement, FLA fighters received word that the Su-24 (the only Su-24 in the country, of which the presence had been confirmed by imsat a few days before) stationed in Bamako was preparing for takeoff. An hour and a half later, the Su-24 was on station and probably provided CAS. The influence the plane had on the battle is unclear, with fights ceasing about 3 hours later: the rest of the convoy managed to pull out of Anomalen and resumed its procession toward Aguelhok.
Casualties and losses
FAMa/AK lost 18% of the vehicles it started with during the 2 ambushes and the attacks as proven through video evidence. The vehicle losses are roughly equally distributed between the convoys armoured, civilian and construction vehicles. Both AK and FAMa took casualties but no definitive number can be placed on the exact amount.
The FLA lost at least 2 pickup trucks and suffered one killed. Their losses are however harder to determine due to the limited amount of footage released by both FAMa and AK.
Most of the footage available of the battle of Anomalen shows no bodies, wounded or captured on both sides. By all accounts, it should be estimated that the toll on human life was lighter than the toll on equipment, at least for FAMa.
Officially, Azawad officials published on the 13th a list of casualties on both sides. This list includes 21 vehicles destroyed and 18 captured, as well as “several dozen” killed and wounded. On their side, they claim 2 pickups destroyed, 3 killed and 7 wounded. This count, which should obviously be taken with a grain of salt, at least tracks with footage released after the communiqué by Afrika Korps.
Later on, various FLA fighters published several eulogies following the 12th and 13th June fights, bringing the death count to 11 according to the author’s count.
The official FAMa communiqué did not provide numbers, but called the engagement a “tactical victory”.
14th June: crash of the Su-24
Early in the morning of the 14th of June, images were published by civilians in Gao showing a fire near the airport. FAMa rapidly published a communiqué in which they claim a plane with 2 pilots “crash landed” after it was surprised by a sandstorm, coming back from a strike mission. Soon after, the FLA claimed to have damaged the plane while it targeted one of its patrols. The pilots were rescued by civilians, and available footage quickly made it clear that the plane was more than “heavily damaged” as claimed by FAMa.
At the moment of the crash, the plane was rumored to have been in Mali for a little more than a month. Sandstorms are known to be a huge issue for air assets in eastern Mali, and are being exploited by rebel and terrorist groups to plan their operations to even the odds.
While the loss of an Su-24 is a heavy loss to the junta, this plane is expected to be replaced by the Russian government.
Use of IEDs by the FLA
There is a definite recent uptick in frequency and lethality of IED attacks orchestrated by the FLA. This is explained by several factors, which all come down to the recruitment of a prominent explosives expert, Mohamed Ag Sahid. This man is a former AQIM officer and was probably recruited in early 2025. With him came not only knowledge, but also a full network to provide an extremely potent and lethal device, the Belgian PRB-M3: an 8kg, low metal content, pressure-activated anti-tank landmine. It is not too dissimilar to the well-known soviet TM-62 in terms of capability. Those mines have been seen used all throughout Africa, mainly coming from Libya to which they were sold in the 80s.
This explosive device boasts greater lethality over makeshift IEDs thanks to the difficulty of finding it with metal detectors due to its low metal content and its purpose made blast charge. Ag Sahid’s knowledge is put to good use by allowing him and his new Alla Ag Albashir unit to operate independently. This has enabled the unit to emplace mines along suspected Junta routes at short notice to ambush unsuspecting convoys.
Conclusion
While the FLA failed to prevent the convoy from reaching Aguelhok, it significantly degraded its potential, both militarily and construction-wise: the plan to create a military airport in Aguelhok, without the destroyed equipment, is at best delayed, and at worst suspended. The military reinforcements to Aguelhok, also necessary to maintain security while the work on the airstrip would unfold (which would undoubtedly become a priority target to all the groups in the area), is weakened both by the destruction of forces, and by the destruction or capture of supplies, necessary to maintain a sizeable force in a part of the country that is quite inhospitable especially at this time of the year.
Officially, this was Afrika Korps’ first major engagement in Mali. While the toll was heavy, it is quite clear that AK provided equipment and experience that prevented the battle from being a complete disaster for the Malian government, just like Wagner before. On the other hand, the heavier equipment of AK did not suffice to turn the tide of battle and that the armed groups still hold the initiative; making clear that, if any progress is to be made by the junta in the northwestern countryside, it will only be through heavier investment in intelligence and infrastructure in the region. But with JNIM increasing the pressure in North-West Mali, an area much closer to Bamako, this is unlikely to be the priority for the time being.
*The author is of the opinion that the name of the group, an obvious reference to nazi Germany’s expeditionnary force in Africa, should be romanized to maintain the clarity of this reference: in russian, there is no grammatical distinction between the two forces.