The first half of 2025 is proving challenging for the AES (Alliance of Sahel States) partners, with an increase in attack frequency, severity, and proximity to sensitive areas. The month of May alone saw more than 400 soldiers killed shared between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. A deep dive into the attacks and their implications for the region’s future.
Major attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
While most of the attacks were carried out by JNIM, the local branch of Al-Qaeda, ISGS (Islamic State in Greater Sahel) is also increasing its activity in the area. In May specifically, attacks against historical and fortified bases, sometimes in sectors previously considered safe, are a worrying trend, and even more so because it has paid off. Below are presented the attacks carried out in late May and early June.
| Dioura attack – Mali, 23/05/2025
On the 23rd of May, JNIM attacked the military base of Dioura in the Mopti area, Mali. The camp was overrun and torched, with the group claiming around 60 killed. As opposed to Boulikessi, it is obvious JNIM feared reinforcements, as they moved quickly and took minimal loot; the main objective was asset denial for the FAMa, Dioura being a forward staging point for operations in the east of Mali. As such, this base has been raided and pillaged several times, in 2015, 2019, and 2023.
A BTR-60 is among the destroyed equipment in Dioura, as per JNIM
| Boulikessi attack – Mali, 01/06/2025
On the 1st of June, at about 5 am, several hundred JNIM terrorists swarmed the military base of Boulikessi in Mali, also known as Fort 11. The assault is coordinated by at least one commercial quadcopter drone, stationary over the base, that provides information in real time on the position of the defenders. The garrison opposes resistance but is overwhelmed, the base is captured for several hours during which the JNIM ransacks the place, seizing 3 military pickups, mortars, and heavy machine guns. Several videos show tens of killed soldiers, including Russians, and JNIM claimed on the 4th more than 100 killed. JNIM also claims to have captured 22 soldiers with video proof, which demonstrates an increase in freedom of movement: prisoners are notably hard to move and manage for an insurgent group with no hometown, as they require an infrastructure to keep them from escaping, and represent an increase in logistics.
The Boulikessi military base with its fortifications. The garrison represents about 150 soldiers.
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Fort 11 is fairly isolated, even by malian standard: no reinforcements were sent, with the camp most likely still empty 4 days later, and air support (in the form of a Bayraktar TB-2) arrived more than 6 hours after the initial contact, too late to provide support to the troops on the ground, although it met some success in neutralizing JNIM elements.
JNIM published image of the claimed loot from the Boulikessi attack
This attack comes 2 weeks after JNIM raided and briefly took control of the town and military base of Djibo, in Burkina Faso, about 70km from Boulikessi. Those attacks represent a coordinated effort to further degrade the border security, which has historically always been a safe haven for the group, benefiting from poor coordination and thinly spread troops between the two states. The AES, a confederation based on a mutual defense pact between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, doesn’t seem to have noticeably changed the response JNIM is facing in those raids.
| Eknewane attack – Niger, 25/05/2025
On the 25th of May, ISGS carried out an attack on two joint military camps in Eknewane, Tahoua region. Those camps were manned by the GIS and the GNN, elite troops of the Niger Armed Forces. Insurgents briefly occupied the base and ransacked it. The attack lasted less than an hour, and ISGS benefited from drone recon for the whole duration of the assault.
The two camps of Eknewane with their fortifications and power station.
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While a part of the garrison managed to flee, the death toll remains heavy: 58 killed, including the commandant, who was captured alive and executed.
The Eknewane camps have been regularly attacked for the past year. On the 18th of September 2024, ISGS attacked, with 24 soldiers confirmed killed, but did not manage to seize the camp. On the 1st of February 2025, the camp was attacked and overrun by ISGS again, killing 46 and capturing 12 soldiers.
The position is crucial to the defense of the Tahoua region against incursions from the Malian border, but the severe lack of ammunition, fire support, or even reinforcements makes the camps little more than a giant target now that ISGS is picking up speed.
Still from an ISGS video, inside Eknewane military camp.
| Falmey attack – Niger, 26/05/2025
In Niger, JNIM ambushed on the 26th of May a patrolling unit of the Nigerian army, killing 45 soldiers out of 71. Among the killed is the captain Abdhoul Aziz Boureima, part of a renowned military family and trained by US forces.
This well planned ambush, east of the Niger river, illustrates an expansion of JNIM’s area of influence.
Notably, several attacks on Falmey were thwarted before, in 2024 and March 2025. What has long been a key government stronghold, crucial to the protection of the commercial roads leading to Benin, Nigeria, and Niamey, the capital, has been defeated.
The economy of the Dosso region is now threatened on 2 sides, JNIM from the west and the Lakurawa, a newly branched out group affiliated to the Islamic State, active in north west Nigeria and perpetrating violent incursions in Niger.
The border area overall is riddled with banditism, in part due to the drop in military cooperation between Niger and Nigeria following the coup in Niger in 2023. It should be noted that Niger government tends to downplay terrorist attacks, especially in civilians, by calling the perpetrators bandits.
Threats on the Dosso region, vital to Niger’s economy.
| Koumbri attack – Burkina Faso, 01/06/2025
On the morning of the 1st of June, JNIM attacked the home base of the 12e RIC in Burkina Faso, near Ouahigouya. The camp was overrun, pillaged, and partly set ablaze, with more than 50 soldiers and 15 VDP (civil defense volunteers) killed.
Most notably in this attack, JNIM managed to loot an armoured vehicle among other heavy weaponry and vehicles.
Koumbri is another large, strategic base that has been targeted several times. In April 2021, the town was under JNIM control for several weeks, during which the population fled. The government forces were unable to attack the city until the terrorists left again. In September 2023, the city was encircled and overtaken again, with officially 17 soldiers and 36 VDP killed.
Just like Eknewane, Koumbri is a frontier garrison against incursions by armed groups coming from the Malian side, making them a necessary target for the groups that require increased freedom of movement, motivated by their successes.
Consequences
In May alone, the AES partners have collectively lost more than 400 soldiers. It is the worst month in terms of casualties in 2025. This article only presents the major attacks, but harassment of forces from various actors is also ongoing: roadside IEDs, police outpost skirmishes, drone drone-dropped munitions on military bases. An inghimasi operation (suicide attack) was also carried out by JNIM in Timbuktu, although little is known about the consequences.
| Implications regarding JNIM’s development
Most non-state groups in western Africa are evidently gaining power, but JNIM seems to be developing at an alarming rate. The cadency at which they were able to gather assault groups, composed of hundreds of fighters and for attacks sometimes more than 200 km apart, implies a worrying manpower reserve and logistical coordination.
In all the attacks listed above, JNIM was able to extract heavy weaponry and associated ammunition that will be used later on against those these weapons were seized from or even in training as seen on recent videos, illustrating a surplus of equipment.
There is also a clear attempt at rebranding, possibly inspired by the “rehabilitation” both the Talibans in Afghanistan and HTS in Syria went through: in the past months, JNIM refrained from attacking civilians, multiplied public announcements regarding the organisation of civilian life under their rule and outreach to elders of communities, provided proof of good treatment for prisoners, and is slowly removing the infamous Seal of Muhammad, associated with the islamic state, from their communications.
All those elements indicate that JNIM is seriously working its way to statehood. While toppling a government and taking its place is unlikely (as that would be seen as an unacceptable act of aggression by most), the emergence of a caliphate in areas out of government control is a definite possibility.
It should be noted that there’s no loyalty to the capitals in isolated and remote communities. According to various observers, most civilians can tell a story of how soldiers or their Russian allies wronged them: airstrikes, cattle slaughter or stealing, abductions, and direct executions are all too common. Most will voluntarily choose the relative safety of insurgent groups that maintain a form of local security system over a remote government that brings troubles when it stops by.
| Reaction by the AES
On the 3rd of June, a curfew was imposed on the central Malian region of Ségou.
The curfew in Timbuktu, active since 2023, has been tightened to 9pm – 6am.
Mali carried out several strikes in the north east, provably targeting civilians, in early June.
While en route to Boulikessi on the 4th of June, the rescue convoy of the Malian army, assisted by russian PMCs, was attacked using a roadside IED, with no proof of damages shown at the time of writing.
Overwhelming, rapid attacks on isolated bases are a recipe exploited by insurgents for a long time in the area, yet no government developed a working strategy to counter or prevent this style of attack. Drones provided by Turkey (Bayraktar TB-2 and Akinci) allow for tracking of the insurgent elements after the fact, but training is lackluster: strikes are often retaliatory, provably targeting civilians instead of fighters, and don’t work as a deterrent.
No improvement has been made in the organisation of the armies of the 3 countries to enhance their effectiveness. Change is motivated by recognition of an existing issue, and the 3 governments are in deep denial :
- Mali acknowledges the attacks, but claim they are under control and inflate the number of insurgents killed.
- Burkina Faso rarely acknowledges the attacks and minimizes the casualties.
- Niger rarely communicates on attacks, but keeps announcing large cleaning operations that seldomly see results.
It is worth noting that the 3 governments are military juntas; they realise the danger an organised army could pose to their reign and might purposely keep the army fragmented and ineffective.
These successive defeats of military camps with no hope of reinforcements are also having an impact on morale: in all the attacks listed above, part of the garrison tried to flee right at initial contact, with more or less success. So much so that JNIM started to adapt their assault techniques to control this effect, while exploiting it: those who surrender are taken prisoner or even released, while those who fight are killed.
Now that all the major non-state actors are fielding drones for tactical purposes, they are proving to be a major issue to the AES, which has realistically no means to counter them so far. According to IMPACT, an investigation group that tracks Wagner-associated movements and information, Russia sent Electronic Warfare equipment to Mali in early June :
While this would technically improve soldiers’ situation against those attacks, much is left to be done to have proper EW coverage to all bases, especially the remote ones, that are the most vulnerable: dispatch, training, maintenance, and power supply are all real challenges 300km away from the nearest city.
| Position of the other non-state actors in the region
The FLA (Azawad Liberation Front) mostly stood back during the latest clashes. In early May, they claimed 2 attacks using FPV drones on military bases in Mali, notably targeting Wagner elements in Tessalit and Léré. While the result is unclear, there is a noticeable uptick in FPV and munition-dropping drones usage by the insurgent groups, pioneered by the FLA and now seen in use by ISGS.
Result of a drone attack in Tessalit base carried out by the FLA, shared by Wagner operators.
The FLA suffered setbacks recently. In December, a large part of the leadership was killed in a Malian drone strike in Tinzawaten. In April, Inkinane Ag Attaher, a prominent commander of the group, was captured in Niger. It should also be noted that nomads faced and are still facing the brunt of the FAMa/Wagner attacks, due to being easily identifiable and targetable with established limits of influence.
For Russia and its PMCs, the situation is complex. Deep in the Ukraine war, resources need to be carefully allocated among its many interests worldwide. And without a serious increase in committed forces to West Africa (not just troops; intelligence, especially, is crucial to restricting freedom of movement to terror groups and preventing attacks, as well as proper air presence and short-notice deployment capabilities), there is no credible way for the situation to improve.
Conclusion
There is a definite degradation of the security in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. For example, the Mbera camp in Mauritania is at a record-high number of Malian refugees, according to the UNHCR :
At the end of march 2025, 118k refugees are registered in M’bera. This is more than 1.5 times the number of refugees right before the beginning of France’s Serval operation in 2013, often considered the “worst moment” of Mali’s recent history.
Russia managed to get a foothold in West Africa and expelled the United Nations by dangling the promise of a more efficient and brutal action and assuring the leaders they wouldn’t meddle in their local politics by making demands such as ensuring democracy. As such, Russia can’t ask the AES states to change their way of operating, as that would diminish their advantage over the UN, in the face of an already less-than-stellar combat record. Russia is then faced with a choice: supporting states that cannot win in their current form, increasing expenses in equipment and lives to the point of replacing the armies of 3 countries with the russian army, or cutting the losses and pulling out. Given the current changes, it seems Russia suffers from the sunk cost fallacy and is unlikely to disengage for the time being. The withdrawal of Wagner, officially announced on the 6th of June, only means the PMC is replaced by others, on which the russian MoD has direct control, such as Rusich and Afrika Korps. This means increased involvement, but not necessarily more means.
The situation in Western Africa is critical, and the juntas fail to acknowledge this reality. Terrorists’ unofficial territory is expanding, seeping into Benin and Togo, also ill-equipped to deal with the threat. If nothing changes, the situation will keep worsening for an increased number of civilians.
Sources :
https://libreinfo.net/burkina-faso-la-mairie-de-koumbri-delocalisee-a-ouahigouya
https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/cep-kas-sahel-monitoring-june-2024